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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last ten years, 1 the macroeconomic team at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College-led by Wynne Godley-has been warning about the unsustainability of the growth path in the U.S. economy, characterized by the accumulation of large and growing debts.
The recession in 2001 was, in our view, a first sign of trouble in this unbalanced growth pattern, but a serious recession was avoided at the time by fiscal and monetary intervention, only to postpone the problem and make it more serious. We have again been warning about the possibility of a recession, 2 which eventually materialized along the lines we projected in Godley et al. (2007) . The first analysis is in Godley (1999) . 2 See Papadimitriou, Zezza, and Hannsgen (2006) and Godley et al. (2007) , among others.
In figure 1 , we compare our projection for real GDP growth, published in Godley et al. (2007) with the actual evolution in GDP, where the vertical line corresponds to the information available at the time of the projection. 3 The chart shows that our model has a good tracking record. At the time we were expecting a moderate recession, although we have become much more pessimistic as new data on financial markets has later become available. 4 Our work is centered around a macroeconometric model that has thus proven to be quite reliable in tracking the U.S. economy over the medium term. Moreover, the approach we adopt for summarizing our results is based on the projection of the financial balances of the private, public, and foreign sectors. Although our approach was quite unconventional, especially since most models discuss households and business separately, it has attracted some attention and has been increasingly adopted or imitated. 5 However, we believe that the use of financial imbalances is sometimes framed in a misleading way, or is grounded in a completely different theoretical approach, so we believe it may be useful to shed some light on our own view on how the dynamics of financial balances can be of guidance to the medium-term prospects of an economy and what is the relation of fiscal policy to such imbalances-and to economic growth-in our framework.
In the next section we will briefly summarize our interpretation of U.S. growth in the last fifteen years and the origins of the current crisis. We will then present in section 3 the main features of the Levy macroeconometric model and then discuss alternative approaches to financial balances in section 4. A discussion of the impact of fiscal policy in section 5 will conclude.
OUR VIEW OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
In our view, the current financial and economic crisis is not the consequence of malpractices in some sectors of the financial industry or a result of policy failure-although both certainly played a role-but rather the inevitable consequence of an unbalanced growth process that 3 Discrepancies between our projection and history before 2007 are due to revisions to U.S. national accounts. 4 Our latest report is Godley, Papadimitriou, and Zezza (2008) . See also Papadimitriou (2009) . 5 See Wolf (2008a and 2008b) . The financial balances approach has been adopted by Goldman Sachs for shortterm projection; see Hatzius (2003 and 2006) , among others. Other approaches to financial balances will be discussed in section 4.
started at the end of the 1980s. 6 Godley's first Strategic Analysis report pointed to seven unsustainable processes:
"(1) the fall in private saving into ever deeper negative territory, (2) the rise in the flow of net lending to the private sector, (3) the rise in the growth rate of the real money stock, (4) the rise in asset prices at a rate that far exceeds the growth of profits (or of GDP), (5) the rise in the budget surplus, (6) the rise in the current account deficit, (7) the increase in the United States' net foreign indebtedness relative to GDP." (Godley 1999: 2) Some of these processes-excluding monetary policy (3) and budget policy (5) 6 The saving rate of the personal sector started to decline around 1985. In the same period the distribution of income started to shift systematically in favor of the richest quintile of the population. For a theoretical model of the relation among the saving rate, borrowing, and the distribution of income, see Zezza (2008) . 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Household Business
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The strong increase in domestic demand (financed by credit) was the main source of U.S. growth in the 2000s, resulting in a widening deficit in the current account balance, which, in turn, cumulated into a growing external debt. In figure 3 we report the net asset position of the United States, relative to GDP, along with an implicit measure of U.S. debt obtained by cumulating the current account balance through time, starting from a benchmark value. This latter figure will not depend on fluctuations of either assets market values or the exchange rate, and the figure clearly shows the very specific feature of the U.S. economy: a depreciation of the exchange rate-similar to the one that began in 2002-has little effect on U.S. liabilities, which are mainly in U.S. dollars, but increases the market value of U.S.
assets abroad (which are mainly in euro, yen, and other strong currencies), resulting in an improvement in the net asset position, even against a large and growing current account deficit. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 50% 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 "The classic explanation of financial crises is that they are caused by excesses-frequently monetary excesseswhich lead to a boom and an inevitable bust. This crisis was no different: A housing boom followed by a bust led to defaults, the implosion of mortgages and mortgagerelated securities at financial institutions, and resulting financial turmoil. 5% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Gov. Deficit (% of GDP)
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Fiscal policy was also used to contrast the drop in domestic demand in the 2001
recession. As figure 6 shows, the federal budget turned from a surplus into a deficit and helped the economy recover. One of the problems with the current recession is thus that fiscal policy is required at a time when the government is already running a deficit. We will come back to fiscal policy in the first section of the paper.
Summing up, the long period of sustained growth in the United States was fueled, in our view, by "excessive" private domestic expenditure, with a major role played by households expenditure in the 2000s, financed by increasing injections of credit. The mainstream view-before the crisis burst-was that growth in domestic expenditure was not 7 See Shaikh et al. (2003) for our early analysis of household debt and the interest payments burden.
excessive, but rather due to rational expectations on future income growth. Our view 8 is that excessive consumption was-at least in part-determined by two joint factors: a shift in the distribution of income towards the richest quintile and the struggle of the median household to keep its relative standard of living against the richest quintile.
In the following we will not explore this issue further, but we will investigate the mechanics linking borrowing and expenditure to growth and financial balances in our model.
THE LEVY MODEL
The Levy macroeconometric model was originally built in the 1990s with annual data and developed over the years, adopting quarterly data and with substantial revisions in the econometric methodology, although we may say that the key properties of the model have been preserved in all subsequent releases. The private sector is modeled as a whole, with no distinction between household and business. 9 The model accounting structure can thus be laid down-at the current stage-with no explicit representation of the financial sector or, better, assuming that the financial sector accommodates any demand for credit, accepts any supply of deposits, and transfers all of its profits to the nonfinancial sector. The SAM has the property that the value of each row is equal to the value of the corresponding column. For the first row and column, the identity is between the value of aggregate demand (including the ex post change in inventories) and the value of production.
For the other rows and columns, the identity is defining saving (in the "Capital Account" row) as the difference between income (the row total) less expenditure (including capital expenditure) and transfers. Accounting consistency requires that, when demand equals supply, the sum of saving for all sectors (i.e., our financial balances) be zero, i.e., NAFA -GD -BP = 0
where NAFA is the net acquisition of financial assets by the private sector, GD is government deficit, and BP the current account in the balance of payments.
The model is developed along the lines of stock-flow consistent models. 10 The stock of net financial assets of each sector increases with net saving, 11 and stocks feed back into flows through interest payments or whenever flows adjust towards a stock-flow norm.
The crucial equation in the model relates private expenditure to disposable income and net financial assets of the private sector, all measured in real terms, that is,
where DE is private expenditure, FA the opening stock of net financial assets, and Z a vector of other variables. Assuming a linear relationship, and abstracting from Z and capital gains, since net assets accumulation is given by:
in steady state, when FA = FA(-1) and therefore DE = YD, equation (2) can be solved to yield a stable ratio between income (YD) and net financial assets (FA). This was one of the ideas underlying the "New Cambridge Hypothesis," which assumed in addition that the private sector would adjust rather quickly to a shock to restore its desired income/assets ratio.
Although Godley usually derived his results from a steady-state assumption, assuming steady growth-which is more reasonable-would not change our results. In steady growth,
where g is the (steady) growth rate in assets. Using (4) and disposable income is stable with respect to the opening stock of financial assets, for stable parameter values. Note also that (6) implies that income and assets grow at the same rate.
In the current model, 12 the income/asset ratio of the private sector is affected by capital gains on homes and equities, as well as borrowing. Namely, an increase in either the real price of equities or the real price of homes will increase expenditure over income (and wealth). Again, the ability to borrow for both households and corporations generates an increase in expenditure over income.
We were careful to test for possible misspecifications. In particular, borrowing and income may depend on expenditure, so we tested for weak exogeneity, as well as for structural breaks, and the equation has passed these tests, as well as the standard battery of specification tests.
The rest of the Levy model is more conventional, following the Keynesian and Post
Keynesian tradition. Trade depends on income and relative prices, trade prices react to the exchange rate, as well as domestic and foreign prices, etc. Some variables, notably inflation, are not modeled in detail yet.
FINANCIAL BALANCES
To properly identify a definition of financial balances that is coherent with national accounting, we may start from the GDP identity:
where B is the balance of trade, C is consumption, G is government expenditure, and I is gross investment including the change in inventories. Adding or subtracting net transfers from sector i to sector j, Tij, and considering the household sector H, business sector B, government sector G, and foreign sector W, we get:
GDP -Thg -Tbg + Twh + Twb = C + I + (G-Thg -Tbg + Tgw) + (B + Twh + Twb -Tgw)
12 See the appendix for a technical discussion of our equation.
If transfers from households and business to the government include taxes, we can further split GDP into personal income, Yh, and business gross profits, Yb. With this simplification, the first bracket in our equation is equal to government deficit:
and the second bracket is equal to the balance of payments on current account BP:
we can thus rewrite (5) as:
(Yh + Tbh + Twh -Thg) + (Yb -Tbg -Tbh) = C + I + GD + BP (11) where Yb includes any net transfers to business from the rest of the world, and we added and subtracted transfers from business to households, Tbh, which will mainly be dividends.
The first term in brackets defines personal disposable income, YDh:
while the second term in bracket in equation (8) defines undistributed profits, Π:
We can now split gross investment into residential investment, Ir, nonresidential investment, Ik, and change in inventories, In. Rearranging equation (11) and using (12) and (13) we get:
(YDh -C -Ir) + (Π -Ik -In) = GD + BP (14) or, defining personal saving, Sh, as:
(Sh -Ir) + (Π -Ik -In) = GD + BP (16) where the two terms on the left-hand side measure the excess of saving over capital expenditure for the household and business sector, respectively, which are therefore the net acquisition of financial assets (NAFA) by such sectors:
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Some stylized facts emerge from figure 7: 1) the saving rate for the personal sector has declined steadily from 1985; 2) as saving declines, the share of residential investment financed by borrowing has increased; 3) in 2000s, the value of new mortgages had exceeded the value of residential investment; 4) the magnitude of the drop in borrowing in the current crisis is unprecedented.
Before the housing bubble burst, several commentators argued that the increase in home prices was not a "bubble," but rather the consequence of market mechanisms that were reducing credit rationing, allowing more households to allocate their expenditure optimally, and the rise in the relative price of homes was thus the consequence of a process of efficient allocation of resources. The fact that the change in mortgages exceeded residential investment shows instead the characteristic features of a speculative bubble, where speculators borrow to buy assets against self-fulfilling expectations of increases in asset prices-that is, until expectations are reversed. 12% 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 Undistributed profits
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In figure 8 we report a comparable picture for the nonfinancial corporate sector.
Profits cover a substantial portion of investment, 14 with the remaining funds acquired through borrowing. It is interesting to note that in the last five years or so the increase in business borrowing was not matched by an increase in investment: this is one part of the "financialization" process, where firms borrowed to invest in financial assets-to buy back their own equities or get equity shares in other businesses. 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 Private sector (Exp. -Inc.)
Government deficit
Balance of payments Source: B.E.A.
% of GDP
The graph in figure 9 reports the financial balance for the private sector as a whole, together with the financial balances of the other two sectors of the economy. Balances behavior seems to differ from an initial period, characterized by a moderate, stable surplus in the current account balance and a surplus in government budget. We can read the balances as net contributions to aggregate demand, implying that in the 1950s and 1960s, demand was mainly driven by net exports and investment. In the next period, the government budget turned into a deficit, the private sector went into surplus, and the current account balance started to deteriorate: fiscal policy was a net contributor to aggregate demand. In the 1990s, the private expenditure increased again relative to income and the current account balance worsened. As we have seen, fiscal policy partly offset the rise in domestic demand up to the 2001 recession and then turned expansionary to counter the drop in domestic demand.
The analysis of financial balances in figure 9 can be developed along three different lines.
1. First of all, as we have discussed, a positive balance implies that, for that sector, injections exceed leakages, so that that sector is a net contributor to aggregate demand.
Since the sum of all balances is always zero, GDP growth can be compatible with any combination of financial balances.
2. Movements in the balances signal an increase (decrease) of injections against leakages. If any of the sectors changes its balance, this will have consequences on the growth rate, as well as being reflected on other balances. For instance, an improvement in the foreign balance-generated, say, by a devaluation-will increase GDP, reduce government deficit, and increase saving against investment. An increase in private expenditure over income will also increase GDP and reduce government deficit, but will make the current account balance worse. Analysis of movements in the balances can thus help understanding the trajectory of the economy.
3. Financial balances imply an accumulation of net financial assets. Whenever a balance is in negative territory, it can thus be interpreted as the net increase in debt, which may be unsustainable above a given threshold.
A first approach to the levels and the dynamics of balances is linked with "New Cambridge." In the 1970s, Godley and associates 15 adopted the balances approach as the basis for a model of the UK economy. As we noted, the approach was unconventional, since it merged households and business, analyzing the private sector as a whole.
The "New Cambridge Hypothesis" was that NAFA-the net acquisition of financial balances for the private sector as whole-was stable, relative to GDP, and any shock to this stable assets/income ratio would be corrected rather quickly.
The implication of this hypothesis was a "twin deficits" result, i.e., any imbalance in the foreign account was matched by an imbalance in the government account. In the face of a crisis that called for expansionary fiscal policy on Keynesian lines, it was thus necessary to adopt measures to counter the implied widening of the current account imbalance. Such measures could be exchange rate devaluation or protectionism.
The "New Cambridge Hypothesis" was grounded in empirical results, which did not hold in the following years, so that the approach was progressively abandoned and basically neglected until Godley's work at The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College started to gain ground for its merits in providing a consistent explanation of the evolution of the U.S.
economy.
At least two research groups have been investigating the economics of financial balances, grounding their work on Godley's approach.
Hatzius, at Goldman Sachs, has modeled financial balances through an error correction approach towards a long-run equilibrium, which is determined by financial variables. In his approach, the private sector balance depends on an indicator for the equity market, an indicator for the housing market, and an indicator for the corporate credit spread (Hatzius 2005: 12) . 16 He claims that his model has good short-run forecasting properties, as movements of balances away from equilibrium seem to be leading indicators for the business cycle.
Taylor and associates 17 have also been investigating financial balances, without developing a full model, but analyzing the relation of each balance to the business cycle and against each other. Their results are quite relevant to the current debate, which sometimes uses financial balances to address the effects of fiscal policy. For instance, Fama uses the identity connecting financial balances to claim that "[t]he added (government) debt absorbs savings that would otherwise go to private investment" (Fama 2009 ). The idea that any increase in government deficit implies a change in the opposite direction for the private sector balance is identified in DeLong (2009) with the "Treasury view" that Keynes opposed. This idea has been proposed again in a more sophisticated form through the Ricardian equivalence, which claims that any increase in government deficit will be discounted by the private sector, generating complete crowding out.
Barbosa-Filho et al. (2006)-among others-show that the Ricardian equivalence approach has no empirical ground, although its proponents still use it 18 to claim that fiscal policy will not be effective for boosting aggregate demand, even in periods of rising unemployment.
We finally want to discuss the relation of financial deficits to the corresponding stock of net liabilities. Abstracting from capital gains, the dynamics of debt, D, is increased by a deficit, DEF, according to:
Dividing through by GDP, and using lower-case letters to denote variables as a share of GDP, we get:
where g is the growth rate in nominal GDP. The stock of debt is increasing, as a share of GDP, whenever:
which gives a useful expression to evaluate the sustainability of financial balances and, therefore, of growth trajectories. For instance, if the stock of debt is 100 percent of GDP, any deficit above the GDP growth rate will result in ever-increasing debt/GDP, which will eventually trigger a crisis.
Inspection of financial balances is therefore useful to quickly evaluate whether a deficit is getting to "excessive" levels and the underlying stock of debt may become unsustainable.
But when is debt unsustainable?
19 A rise in debt implies an increase in the risk of default and larger interest payments as a share of income. The public sector should be better equipped to cope with this, especially when the central bank is willing to finance any new debt that is not absorbed in the market.
19 A more sophisticated analysis of debt sustainability can be developed taking interest rates into account, and standard specifications usually show that debt will rise as a share of output whenever the interest rate is larger than the growth rate, with a primary deficit equal to zero. We do not follow these lines since we are interested here in directly comparing financial balances to debt accumulation.
For similar reasons, the United States is able to finance a growing external debt, as long as the world is willing to accept U.S. dollars as a reserve currency. Private sector debt is more prone to trigger a crisis and we therefore believe it is better-in the current crisis-to substitute private debt with public debt through fiscal expansion.
FISCAL POLICY IN THE LEVY MODEL
Our latest exercise in estimating the effects of fiscal policy with the Levy model has been recently presented in Godley, Papadimitriou, and Zezza (2008) and Papadimitriou (2009) .
We are interested here in the effects of an increase in fiscal deficit over the other financial balances. In our exercise, we explore the effects of two shocks to government outlays-both expenditure and transfers-where the second shock is twice the first, and compare our results with a baseline projection.
20
Results for the impact on balances-compared to the baseline-are reported in figure   10 . We note that in the long run the private sector balance tends to revert to its baseline value, so that a shock to government deficit has an impact on foreign deficit of almost equal proportions. Our model therefore respects the "New Cambridge Hypothesis," but only in the medium term. Any fiscal expansion will result in a wider external deficit, therefore fiscal policy in the United States alone will not solve, but may worsen, the problem of global financial imbalances. Coordinated international efforts are required for fiscal expansion in surplus countries and/or a realignment of exchange rates.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored the main properties of the Levy macroeconomic model for the United States, which has proven to be a useful tool to track the evolution of the U.S. economy in the medium term.
We have shown the relation of the model to the "New Cambridge" school and discussed the implications for the analysis of the financial balances of the private, government, and foreign sectors. We have briefly presented our interpretation of the evolution of the U.S. economy in the last 15 years, claiming that it has been driven by domestic demand financed by borrowing, thus generating a rising debt-to-income ratio for the private sector, which would sooner or later trigger a crisis.
Finally, we have discussed how financial balances can be used to assess the role of fiscal policy. Our empirical results show that government expenditure can and should play a role in sustaining aggregate demand when either the private or the foreign sectors are shrinking. In our approach, however, fiscal policy will generate larger external deficits in the medium term, which should be countered through additional policy intervention.
Our current line of research aims at developing a more disaggregated model, where households and nonfinancial businesses are tackled separately to verify if results obtained modeling the private sector as a whole still hold. Where:
APPENDIX. The Econometrics of Private Expenditure
• PE = private expenditure at chained 2000 prices;
• YD = private disposable income at chained 2000 prices;
• FA = the opening stock of financial assets, deflated by the PE deflator. The stock of financial assets is the sum of government debt (obtained cumulating government deficits from a benchmark value) and foreign net assets (obtained cumulating the current account balance from a benchmark value); • PFA = S&P 500 index, deflated by the PE deflator;
• PH = the Realtor.org index for the median price of existing single-family homes, deflated by the PE deflator; • DBH = the change in household debt outstanding, deflated by the PE deflator;
• DBB = the change in business debt outstanding, deflated by the PE deflator. where numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
